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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
17600 
These Appeals are taken from two Orders entered by 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
January 28, 1981, dismissing with prejudice the Complaints on 
file in these actions as against Defendant-Respondent Fireman's 
Fund Insurance Companies only. These Appeals are also taken 
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from two further Orders entered by the District Court denying 
Appellants' motions to modify the Orders of Dismissal and 
entering final Judgments in favor of Respondents insofar as 
those Orders denied Appellants leave to amend. The Complaints 
in both actions, insofar as relevant herein, sought recovery 
under a Motor Vehicle Dealer's Bond issued by Respondent in 
favor of Defendant Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc. The two 
actions have been consolidated for all purposes, including Appea. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants request this Court to reverse the Judgment; 
appealed from and remand this case to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These actions, which have been consolidated for all 
purposes 1 , were collllilenced to recover money loaned by Plaintiffs 
to Defendant Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc. ("Call Auto") 
in essentially identical transactions. 2 
Appellants allege in their Complaints (B. R. 2 & 42; 
L.R.2) that they were induced through fraud to pay money to 
1 "B.R." The transcript in the Betenson case will be cited as 
and the transcript in the Lowin case as "L.R.". 
2 The allegations of both Complaints insofar as relevant to 
these appeals and to the claims against Respondent are ot 
for all intents and purposes the same. Res~ond~nt ~as n 
named as a Defendant in the original Complaint in.t e 
8 Betenson action. However, an Amendment to Complaint fw!ction 
filed on or about October 15, 19~0, addi~g a ca~~ef~vor 
against Respondent on its Dealer s Bond issued i 
of Call Auto (B.R.42). 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Call Auto, which was engaged in the business as a motor vehicle 
dealer, in consideration for Call Auto's promise to repay 
Appellants' money together with a guaranteed profit in specified 
installments. Call Auto represented and agreed that all monies 
paid by Appellants would be at all times fully secured by prop-
erty and equipment owned by Call Auto. Subsequently, Call Auto 
fraudulently disposed of substantially all of the property and 
equipment which Call Auto represented would serve as security 
for Appellants' indebtedness without regard to Appellants' 
security interest in that property and equipment and failed to 
repay Appellants as agreed. 
The Complaints seek recovery against Respondent under 
a Dealer's Bond issued in favor of Call Auto in the amount of 
$20,000.00 pursuant to the provisions of Section 41-3-16, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). Pursuant to the terms of the bond, 
Respondent agreed to pay any claims or judgments against Call 
Auto for violation of the Motor Vehicle Act or fraud. 
In each transaction entered into with Appellants, 
Call Auto executed with Appellants a standard form agreement 
which Call Auto had prepared. 3 The form agreements each recited 
that Call Auto had approached each Appellant for the purpose of 
entering into an investment in Call Auto's business "as a type 
of joint venture", that Call Auto was going to use the funds 
in buying and selling various types of personal property and 
3 All the agreements between Appell~n~s and Call Au~o were 
attached to the Complaints as exhibits (B.R.20-32, L.R.7) · 
A copy of the form agreement entered into between Cal~ Auto 
and the Lowin Appellants is attached hereto as Appendix A 
for the Court's reference. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
equipment at a profit "in its business" and that Call Auto 
guaranteed to pay to each Appellant "as his or her share of the 
profits and investments" certain specific amounts in installment 
In some cases, Call Auto even executed promissory notes (B.R.28) 
Respondent subsequently moved to dismiss both Complaint, 
as against it on the basis that Call Auto and Appellants were, 
as a matter of law, joint venturers with respect to Call Auto's 
business, and, consequently, Appellants were not entitled to 
the protection of the Dealer's Bond (B. R .100&134-142; L. R. 23). 
On or about January 28, 1981, the Trial Court granted 
the Motions to Dismiss with prejudice in both actions on the 
basis that the "joint venture" language of the form agreements 
conclusively established a joint venture between the parties 
as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court concluded Appellants 
were not entitled to the protection of the Dealer's Bond 
(B.R.144&156; L.R.28-29). 
Appellants subsequently filed motions to reconsider 
the Orders of Dismissal or to at least modify those Orders 
to allow Appellants leave to amend the Complaints (B.R.169; 
L. R. 30). These motions were denied by the District Court in 
February 1981, and, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the District Court directed that final 
judgment be entered in favor of Respondent in both actions 
(B.R.174; L.R.36). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
APPELLANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER RESPONDENT'S 
BOND. 
The sole question before the District Court was whether, 
accepting the allegations of the Complaints in these actions as 
true, the Complaints nevertheless failed to state a claim 
against Respondent upon which relief could be granted. One 
author has stated the standard by which a Motion to Dismiss 
should be considered as follows: 
"For the purposes of the motion, the well-
pleaded facts are taken as admitted .... 
A complaint should not be dismissed for in-
sufficiency unless it alpears to a certainty 
that laintiff is entit ed to no relief under 
state o ort 
See also, Motivated Management Intern. v. Finney, 604 P.2d 469 
(Ut. 1979); Barrus v. Wilkinson, 398 P.2d 207 (Ut. 1965); King 
Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254 (Ut. 1962). 
Even if a Complaint fails to state a claim it is an 
abuse of discretion for a Court to deny leave to amend, "if 
it appears at all possible that the Plaintiff can correct the 
defect." 2A Moore's Federal Practice, Sec. 15.10; Topping v. 
~. 147 F. 2d 715 (7th Cir. 1945) ("Litigation is not an art 
in nice pleadings. It can and should seldom be settled on its 
merits at the pleading stage .... ") 
When viewed according to the standards set forth 
above, Appellants respectfully submit that the Judgments 
-5-
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appealed from should be reversed on the following grounds: 
A. It is settled in Utah that a person who loans 
money to a motor vehicle dealer is entitled to protection under 
the Dealer's Bond. 
B. Whether a joint venture or debtor-creditor rela-
tionship existed in these actions is a question of fact to be 
determined based upon all the facts and circumstances concernini 
the relationship between the parties and not solely from the 
terminology employed by Call Auto in its form agreements. 
C. Even if the language of the form agreements is 
conclusive, as a matter of law, as to the existence of a joint 
venture, it is clear that the provisions of the agreements do 
not legally constitute a joint venture but rather create a 
debtor-creditor relationship between the parties. 
D. In the event the Court feels the allegations of 
the present Complaints are inadequate to state a cause of 
action, substantial evidence exists in these cases that none of 
the parties, including Call Auto, intended to enter into joint 
ventures but rather intended and believed they had entered into 
loan transactions and Appellants should be allowed to amend their 
Complaints to more specifically allege that they entered into 
loan transactions with Call Auto and not joint ventures. 
A. A PERSON LOANING MONEY TO A MOTOR VEHICLE DEAL~ 
IS ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER THE DEALER'S BOND. 
Pursuant to Section 41-3-16, Utah Code Annotated (19SJ), 
ithOU'. 
l.·n busi"ness as a motor vehicle dealer w no person can engage 
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first obtaining a bond in the penal sum of $20,000.00 to protect 
the public. Section 41-3-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953), specifies 
the members of the public who are entitled to protection under 
such bond. 
"If any person shall suffer any loss or damage 
by reason of fraud, fraudulent representation or 
violation of any of the provisions of this act 
by a licensed dealer or one of his salesmen . . . 
such person shall have a right of action against such 
dealer ... and/or the sureties upon their respective 
bonds." (Emphasis added) 
This statute should be broadly construed to protect all persons 
doing business with a motor vehicle dealer. Western Surety Co. 
v. Redding, 626 P.2d 437 (Ut. 1981). 
There is really no dispute between the parties that, 
as made clear by this Court in the case of Lawrence v. Ward, 
300 P.2d 619 (Ut. 1956), a person loaning money to a motor 
vehicle dealer is entitled to the protection of the Dealer's· 
Bond in accordance with the broad language of Section 41-3-18. 
In Lawrence, the bank which financed the Defendant 
motor vehicle dealer's business recovered a Judgment against 
the dealer's bonding company for the fraud of the dealer. On 
appeal, the bonding company argued that the financier of a 
motor vehicle dealer's business was not within the class of 
persons intended by the statute to be protected by the bond. 
This Court rejected that contention and held that the financier 
of the motor vehicle dealer's business was entitled to be pro-
tected by the bond, quoting from the case of Gotmnercial Standard 
Insurance Company v. West, 249 P.2d 830, 832 as follows: 
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"The statute in question encompasses and the 
bond is given to cover the business of selling 
used cars. That this is more than just the 
actual sale or exchange of a used car is 
apparent from the statute itself .... A person 
who.engages in the used car business, as in any 
business, must concern himself not alone with 
selling but with all the myriad details required 
to conduct such a business. That each part of 
the business contributes to the total success 
or failure is patent. 
"'Also the statute itself is broader, we 
believe, in allowing recovery against a 
principal and his surety by persons injured 
by the unlawful acts of the dealer than the 
narrow construction contended for by Appellant.'" 
See, also, Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Central 
Finance Co., 237 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1951). 
Thus, if Appellants should be able to establish at 
trial that they were induced to loan money to Call Auto through 
fraud and have suffered damages as a proximate result of such 
fraud, then Plaintiffs are entitled to recover on Call Auto's 
Dealer Bond issued by Respondent. 
B. WHETHER A JOINT VENTURE EXISTED BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES IS A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE DETERMINED AT THE TRIAL 
BASED UPON ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND NOT MERELY FROM 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENTS. 
Although, as argued below, Appellants do not believe 
that the language of the form agreement is such as to legally 
constitute a joint venture, even if the agreement on its face 
appeared to provide for a joint venture, the agreement would not 
-8-
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be conclusive as to whether a joint venture in fact existed. 
In order to establish a joint venture, it must be 
demonstrated that: 
1. The parties intended to establish a joint 
venture; 
2. That they have an agreement to share the profits 
and losses of the venture; 
3. That they have a proprietary interest in the 
business; and 
4. That they have a right of mutual contol over 
the subject matter of the venture. 
For example, in Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Ut. 1974), 
the Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an oral agreement pur-
suant to which Plaintiff agreed to purchase 100 head of cattle, 
Defendant would care for the cattle, the offspring would be sold 
by Plaintiff and the profits divided equally. There was no 
agreement as to the sharing of losses should any occur. The 
trial court held that the relationship between the parties was 
that of joint venturers, ordered Defendant to account for certain 
calves which he had in his possession and held the parties 
would have to equally share the losses if any there were. In 
reversing the trial court's judgment and holding that no joint 
venture existed, this Court stated: 
"A joint venture is an agreement between tw'? 
or more persons ordinarily but not necessarily 
limited to a single transaction for the purpose 
of making a profit. The require~ents for the 
relationship are not exactly defined, but cer-
tain elements are essential: The parties must 
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combine their pr~perty, money, effects, skill, 
labor and knowledge. As a general rule, there 
must be a community of interest in the perfor-
mance of the common purpose, a joint proprie-
tary interest in the subject matter, a mutual 
right of control, a right to share in the profits 
and unless there is an agreement to the con- ' 
trary, a duty to share in any losses which may be 
sustained. 
"While the agreement to share losses need not 
necessarily be stated in specific terms, the 
agreement must be such as to permit the court 
to infer that the parties intend to share 
losses as well as profits." (Id. at 2) 
Each of the prerequisites set forth above presents a 
factual issue which cannot be answered on a Motion to Dismiss 
simply because the written agreements prepared by Call Auto 
used "joint venture" language, but rather must be determined 
based upon all of the facts, circumstances and conduct of the 
parties. 
Thus, in Bender v. Bender. 397 P. 2d 957, 962 (Mont. 
1965), the Court stated: 
"To establish a joint venture or a partnership, 
it is necessar to determine the intent of the 
parties; such business re ations ips arise on y 
when the parties intend to associate themselves 
as such .... there must be a joint proprietary 
interest and a right of mutual control over the 
subject matter of the enterprise or over the 
property engaged therein, and there must be an 
agreement to share the profits .... the inten-
~ion of the arties has to be clearl manifested 
. an must be ascertaine rom a t e acts 
and circumstances and the actions and conduct of 
the parties." (Emphasis added) 
In Vineland Homes v. Barish, 292 P. 2d 941, 947 (Cal. 
1956), the Court, quoting from Lusher v. Silver, 161 P.2d 472, 
473, said: 
-10-
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"In the last anal::rsis t~e fact of partnership 
depends upon the intention of the parties. To 
determine ~his intent not only the words of ·tfle 
a reement itself, but the actions and conduct 
o the parties may be consi ere . Emp asis 
added) 
Likewise, in Porter v. Moore, 300 P.2d 513 (Mont. 1956) 
the Court observed: 
"The appellant Porter complains that the 
District Court erred in determining that the 
contract entered into between the parties did 
not constitute a partnership. However, the 
existence of a partnership depends upon th"e" 
intention of the arties which must be ascer-
ta1ne rom a the acts an circumstances 
and the actions and conduct of the arties. 
i e bot parties re erre to t e agree-
ment as a partnership, in their pleadings and 
in their testimony, and both purported to have 
pleaded the alleged terms of the agreement 
nevertheless the alle ation of ' artnershi ' 
is but a ega cone usion an neit er the 
trial court nor the a ellate court will be 
oun by nomenc ature to t e exc 
substance." (Id at p. 517-518) 
added) ~ 
And, in Simpson v. Bates, 239 P.2d 749 (Ut. 1952), 
Defendant Simpson and Cross-Complainant Saunders were two licensed 
used car dealers who did business from the same used car lot 
and shared the rent, telephone, furnishings and buildings on 
the car lot. The sign on the premises read, "Used Cars" with 
Saunders' name at one end and Simpson's at the other. When one 
of them sold a car belonging to the other, he was paid a fee 
of $25.00. 
In the transaction at issue there, Defendant Simpson 
had sold a car to a customer but Cross-Claimant Saunders was 
going to arrange the financing for the customer so Saunders 
filled out the contract with the customer showing himself as 
-11-
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seller. Defendant Simpson failed to deliver title to the car 
to the customer and Cross-Claimant Saunders sought to recover 
from Simpson's bonding company certain amounts he had been re-
quired to pay the finance company. The bonding company argued 
Saunders could not recover because he was a joint venturer with 
Simpson on the sale of the car. In rejecting this contention 
and affirming the judgment against the bonding company on the 
basis that Saunders and Simpson were not joint venturers becau;: 
they had no agreement to nor did they share profits, this Court 
went behind the terms of the subject sales agreement showing 
Saunders as the seller (which if true would have precluded re-
covery on Simpson's bond), and examined the real nature and 
substance of the transaction which showed Saunders was not in 
fact the seller. 
The rationale of the District Court's decision seems 
clear. That is, if Appellants were joint venturers or partners 
with Call Auto such that they had a right to or did in fact 
participate in the operation of Call Auto's business, Appellant: 
were, in effect, co-owners of the business which obtained the 
bond for the protection of the public and should not be entitlei 
to the protection of that bond. Assuming this reasoning is 
correct, the existence of a joint venture between the parties 
should be determined based upon what the parties intended and 
-12-
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Ii: 
ec 
what really happened, not by artificially limiting the inquiry 
to a few words from the form agreement. Based upon the foregoing 
authorities, it seems clear that neither the Court nor the parties 
are bound by the nomenclature used by Call Auto in its form 
agreement and that a factual issue is presented which must be 
resolved at trial. 
C. EVEN IF THE LANGUAGE OF THE FORM AGREEMENT WERE 
BINDING, THAT LANGUAGE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO LEGALLY CONSTITUTE 
A JOINT VENTURE. 
As previously stated, the form agreements which were 
prepared by Call Auto recited that Appellants were paying money 
to Call Auto "as a type of joint venture" (whatever that is), 
that Call Auto was going to use that money to purchase and sell 
property at a profit "in its business" and that Call Auto guaran-
teed to pay Appellants a guaranteed "profit" in specified in-
stallments regardless of whether Call Auto made any profit 
in its business or the amount of such profits. Furthermore, 
the monies paid by Appellants were required to be fully secured 
by Call Auto at all times. And, in some of the transactions, 
Call Auto even executed promissory notes in favor of Appellants. 
The provisions of the form agreements on their face are not 
sufficient to constitute a joint venture under the standards 
set forth above. 
First, it is clear under the agreements that the 
business is solely Call Auto's business and that Appellants are 
given no proprietary interest therein whatsoever and no right 
of control over the subject matter of the enterprise. 
-13-
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Second, although the agreements speak in terms of 
paying Appellants a share of the profits, there is no question 
but that the agreements in reality simply guarantee that 
Appellants will be paid a set amount regardless of the profits 
or losses realized by Call Auto in its business. To secure the:; 
debts, the agreements purported to grant security interests~ 
Call Auto's assets to Appellants. The Court faced a similar 
situation in Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 194 P.2d 992 (Ore. 
1948). In that case, the Plaintiff had invented a lift truck 
and the parties entered into an agreement pursuant to which 
Defendant was to produce the lift truck. Plaintiff set up 
dealerships throughout the country and was to receive eight per· 
cent of gross sales. The Court held that the agreement did not 
constitute a joint venture, saying: 
"He (Mamon) was not at that time, under any 
definition of joint adventure that we have seen 
or within the holding of any case to which we 
have been referred, a joint adventurer with 
Vaughan, because he did not share in the profits 
of the business as such, but under his agreement 
was entitled to his com ensation of ei ht er-
cent w ether there were pro its or not. Emphasis 
added) 
Moreover, even if the agreements in the present case 
gave Appellants a share of the profits of Call Auto, that fact 
would not be conclusive as to the existence of a joint ventun 
if it is shown that Appellants were being paid those profits 
in repayment of a loan and not because they were co-owners of 
the business. Thus, Utah Code Annotated, Section 48-1-4(4), 
provides as follows: 
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"The receipt by a person of a share of the 
profits of a business is prima facia evidence 
that he is a partner in the business but no 
such inference shall be drawn if such profits 
were received in payment: 
''(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise. 
"(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts 
of payment vary with the profits of the business." 
To the same effect, see Hayes v. Killinger, 385 P.2d 
747 (Ore. 1963); True v. High Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., 
577 P.2d 991 (Wy. 1974); Nelson v. Abraham, 177 P.2d 931 (Cal. 
1947). 
Finally, there is no agreement whatsoever as to sharing 
the losses of Call Auto and the circumstances are not such as 
to permit the Court to infer such an agreement in view of the 
fact that many of the Appellants have been repaid certain amounts 
notwithstanding the fact that Call Auto suffered very substantial 
losses. Such an agreement is essential to the existence of a 
joint venture. Bas-sett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Ut. 1974). 
D. IF THE PRESENT COMPLAINTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, LEAVE TO A.1'1END THE COMPLAINTS SHOULD BE 
GRANTED AS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE HAS BEEN ADDUCED IN THESE ACTIONS 
THAT NONE OF THE PARTIES INTENDED TO ENTER INTO JOINT VENTURES 
BUT, RATHER, INTENDED TO ENTER INTO LOAN TRANSACTIONS, 
Appellants respectfully submit that the present Complaints 
are sufficient to state a cause of action against Respondent and 
that the District Court's Orders dismissing the Complaints should 
be reversed. However, should this Court believe that the Com-
plaints are not sufficient to state a cause of action, it is 
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submitted that the trial court's Orders should be reversed at 
least to the extent of allowing Appellants leave to amend the 
Complaints to more specifically allege that no joint ventures wer, 
intended to be entered into, nor were they entered into, and that 
the transactions between the parties constituted loan transaction; 
Such a ruling is clearly in the interest of justice as 
substantial evidence exists already in this action that the part!; 
did not intend to enter into joint ventures nor did they believe 
that such relationships had been entered into. For example, 
Call Auto alleges in its Answers in these actions that the trans· 
actions with Plaintiffs were loan transactions (B.R.74; L.R.12). 
Also, the Affidavit of Call Auto's President, Elroy T. Barlow 
(B.R.65-66) shows very clearly that Call Auto intended to and 
believed it had entered into secured loan transactions with 
Plaintiffs, not joint ventures. Thus, Mr. Barlow states in part 
"Affiant represents . . . that as early as 
February 7, 1979 (six months before Appellants 
first paid any money to Call Auto) pursuant 
to a Board of Directors Meeting attended by 
Mr. Campbell, there it was unanimously decided 
Call Auto should continue receivin loan 
proceeds rom individual parties. 
(Emphasis added) 
Mr. Barlow further states in his Affidavit that: 
"At a Board of Direcotrs Meeting held on 
October 15, 1979, ... loans by individual 
creditors were discussed and it was unani-
mously agreed that an effort should be made to 
reduce the amount of interest previously approved 
on such loans . . . 
"Affiant further represents that at all times 
during the operational period of Call Auto, 
he has discussed and acted in concert with 
L. A. Campbell in making business decis~o~s for 
the corporation to include though not ~im~t~d 
to the authority to obtain loans from individual 
lenders together with the interest and terms 
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In addition, Call Auto has produced minutes of Board Meetings 
during 1979, both before and after Appellants initially paid 
money to Call Auto, showing very clearly that Call Auto viewed 
the transactions as loans (B.R.115&119). The Affidavit of L. A. 
Campbell, a principal shareholder and officer of Call Auto, 
also shows that Call Auto believed it had borrowed the money 
from Appellants (B.R.62). 
Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that under 
these circumstances it was an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to deny leave to amend the Complaints where very 
clearly any possib~e defects in the Complaints could be 
corrected. 
CONCLUSWN 
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court 
erred in dismissing the Complaints with prejudice and without 
leave to amend and that the Judgments should be reversed by 
this Court. Appellants should not be precluded from recovering 
on the Dealer's Bond issued by Respondent in favor of Call Auto 
simply because the form agreements prepared by Call Auto use the 
term "as a type of joint venture". Rather, the true nature of the 
relationship between the parties should be determined based 
upon all the facts and circumstances at trial. Appellants should 
be given the opportunity to prove at trial that they had no 
right to, nor did they, participate in or control the operation 
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of Call Auto's business and that they simply made what they beli, 
were secured loans to Call Auto. 
DATED this .227~day of ~ , 1981. 
Respec:fUl}: submitted, 
BURBIDGE, MABEY & MITCHELL 
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APPENDIX A 
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AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT• entered into this P. 6 4 day or . 
ajmf . ,.m . ., ~• -·-=~ 
herein referred to as FIRST PARTY• and ~ _ _ , 
herein referred to as SECOND PARTY: 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS. SECOND PARTY has an established business in the buying and 
selling of all types or personal property and equipment. and: 
WHEREAS• SECOND PARTY has approached FIRST PARTY for the purpose of 
entering into an investment in their business as a type of joint venture, 
and; 
WHEREAS. each of the parties have obtained independent legal counsel 
and are fully aware of this business transaction; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises of the parties and 
as further set forth herin. the undersigned parties hereby agree as follows: 
~IRST P~ herevit~P. s over to SECOND PARTY the ~- (/ , --/../!~/'/~~ ($ ~"/~ ....... a.......;:;.o.c.,;;,ti"""1:2"""0 ..... ,'-<29-----sum of cash to 
be used by SECOND PARTY in buying and selling various types of personal 
property and equipment at a profit in its business. 
2. SECOND PARTY agrees and guarantees to pay over to the FIRST PARTY, as 
his or her share of the profits and investment, the following sums of money 
b 
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chase price of -----
This agreement es, Inc. clear title to the 
y and/or all liens and 
encumbrances. Auto and Equipment Sales• Inc. 
the right t 
3. It is further understood that the am:>unt of investment to be 
returned to F:IBST PARTY will also be shown by and secured by various 
personal property and equipment in the business• but it is t'urther 
understood that SECOND PARTY s::,,.w.i be able to deal at a profit with 
that property and equipnent if they deem it expedient and proper. 
4. It is further understood and agreed that the parties hereto 
may continue the investment for an additional ftt!- t./~ period 
t7 
or longer• if the parties may determine• under the same terms and 
conditions and repayment of profits to FmST PARTY as set forth in 
paragraph 2 herein. 
INWITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned parties have executed this 
agreement the day and year first above written. 
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